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To	Paula,	with	gratitude	
	
	
Abstract	
Dissociative	Identity	Disorder	(DID)	(American	Psychiatric	Association	2013)	is	examined	
in	this	paper	from	the	perspective	of	its	relevance	to	the	criminologist.	As	this	psychiatric	
condition	 is	 linked	 to	 severe	 and	 prolonged	 childhood	 abuse,	 accounts	 of	 DID	 patients	
inevitably	 involve	 reports	 of	 serious	 crimes,	 in	 which	 the	 person	 was	 the	 victim,	
perpetrator	 or	 witness.	 These	 reports	 can	 thus	 contain	 crucial	 information	 for	 criminal	
investigations	 by	 the	 police	 or	 for	 court	 proceedings.	 However,	 due	 to	 the	 person’s	
dissociation,	 such	 reports	 are	 often	 very	 confusing,	 hard	 to	 follow,	 hard	 to	 believe	 and	
difficult	to	obtain.	They	also	frequently	state	that	the	person	had	‘no	choice’,	a	thorny	notion	
for	the	criminologist	(as	well	as	for	the	clinician).	Through	the	analysis	of	clinical	examples,	
the	paper	explores	how	decisions	are	made	by	a	person	with	DID,	the	notions	of	choice	and	
‘competent	 reasoning’,	 and	 the	practical	 and	 ethical	ways	 for	 interviewing	 a	 person	with	
DID.	
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Introduction	
The	relevance	of	Dissociative	Identity	Disorder	(DID)	to	criminology	is	quite	direct:	DID	is	linked	
to	severe	and	prolonged	childhood	abuse;	that	is,	to	crime.	Furthermore,	some	people	with	this	
complex	condition	continue	to	be	involved	in	a	life	of	on‐going	abuse,	that	is,	further	crime.	DID	
is	 thus	 a	 condition	which	 brings	 together	 criminologists	 and	mental	 health	 practitioners,	 and	
challenges	them	both.		
	
Professionals	in	both	fields	regularly	struggle	with	the	question	of	what	did	actually	happen	in	
the	 traumatic	 past	 of	 a	 person	 with	 DID,	 as	 accounts	 given	 by	 such	 persons	 are	 often	
uncorroborated,	 inconsistent	 and	 confusing.	 Moreover,	 in	 some	 cases,	 it	 appears	 that	 the	
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person’s	childhood	trauma	has	not	ended	in	childhood,	but	continues	as	a	life‐long	involvement	
in	abuse.	Such	a	person	may	still	be	a	victim,	a	perpetrator	or	a	silent	witness	to	crime,	and	the	
uncertainty	 regarding	 their	 past	 is	 extended	 into	 their	 life	 in	 the	 present.	 Most	 confusingly,	
however,	such	a	person	often	states	that	his	or	her	current	involvement	in	on‐going	abuse	is	in	
complete	 contradiction	 to	 his	 or	 her	 own	 wishes.	 Clearly,	 both	 criminologists	 and	
psychotherapists	struggle	with	such	a	notion	of	‘no	choice’,	which	also	implies	no	responsibility.		
	
Given	 the	 breadth	 and	 complexity	 of	 the	 field,	 I	 have	 not	 aimed,	 in	 this	 paper,	 to	 offer	
comprehensive	discourse	about	DID.	Instead,	I	have	limited	myself	to	a	brief	description	of	this	
condition,	 and	 focus	 on	 three	 specific	 questions	 which	 are	 of	 special	 relevance	 to	 the	
criminologist:		
	
1. Is	it	possible	to	find	out	what	actually	happened?		
2. Did	the	person	have	a	choice,	and	does	he	or	she	have	capacity	to	make	a	choice	in	the	
first	place?		
3. How	can	a	person	with	DID	be	interviewed	effectively	and	ethically,	without	causing	
further	trauma?	
	
The	 clinical	 examples	 which	 I	 use	 to	 illustrate	 the	 discussion	 come	 from	 my	 clinical	 and	
supervisory	work	over	the	past	twenty	years.	In	order	to	preserve	anonymity,	all	the	examples	
are	amalgamations	of	material	 from	several	 cases,	 and	never	 a	 description	of	 a	 single	person.	
The	one	exception	is	the	case	of	Paula.	Paula	has	specifically	asked	for	her	story	to	be	told	with	
only	 minimal	 changes,	 as	 part	 of	 her	 contribution	 to	 knowledge	 in	 the	 field	 of	 trauma	 and	
dissociation.	This	paper	is	dedicated	to	her.	
	
Dissociative	Identity	Disorder	
Dissociative	 Identity	 Disorder	 (DID)	 is	 the	 most	 complex	 of	 a	 group	 of	 disorders	 called	
Dissociative	 Disorders	 (DDs)	 (American	 Psychiatric	 Association	 (APA)	 2013),	 which	 are	
associated	with	prolonged	and	severe	childhood	trauma	and	abuse.2	Put	in	a	nutshell,	it	can	be	
said	that	the	brain	can	develop	the	capacity	to	disown	or	dissociate	experiences	which	are	too	
extreme	and	overwhelming	(Bromberg	1995;	Chu	2011;	Courtois	and	Ford	2013;	Freyd	1996;	
Stein	2007).	Such	experiences	are	then	stored	or	‘coded’	(Sandler	and	Fonagy	1997)	in	the	brain	
as	though	they	were	not	real;	as	though	they	did	not	happen	to	oneself	but	to	someone	else;	or	as	
though	they	did	not	happen	at	all.	
	
Trauma‐linked	 dissociation	 protects	 the	 person	 by	 separating	 him	 or	 her	 from	 a	 traumatic	
experience.	For	example,	a	man	describes	the	seconds	of	a	car‐crash	in	which	he	lost	his	leg:	‘It	
was	as	if	I	was	watching	myself	from	the	outside,	observing	the	collision.	I	didn’t	feel	any	fear	or	
pain’.		This	man	remembers	the	event,	but	as	though	he	was	‘watching	it	from	the	outside’	rather	
than	experiencing	it.	This	dissociative	experience	(depersonalisation	type)	protects	him	from	the	
full	impact	of	the	trauma.	
	
Such	 ‘one‐off’	 traumatic	 experiences	 may	 result	 in	 other	 forms	 of	 dissociation	 (often	 in	
conjunction	 with	 flashbacks	 as	 in	 Post	 Traumatic	 Stress	 Disorder	 (PTSD)):	 derealisation,	 in	
which	the	person	feels	that	what	happened	was	not	real;	or	amnesia,	the	inability	to	recall	 the	
event	altogether.	All	these	presentations	may	be	familiar	to	criminologists	from	interviews	in	the	
wake	of	a	violent	crime	with	victims	as	well	as	with	perpetrators.	Inasmuch	as	such	experiences	
are	limited	to	a	one‐off	trauma,	they	constitute	a	dissociative	symptom,	but	would	not	warrant	a	
diagnosis	of	a	dissociative	disorder.	
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The	following	example,	however,	is	quite	different.	A	five‐year‐old	girl	explained	her	drawing	to	
her	 therapist	 (Southgate	1996):	 ‘this	 is	me,	 sitting	 in	 the	ceiling,	watching	daddy	hurting	 little	
girl	(on	the	floor)’.		
	
Like	the	man	in	the	car‐crash,	the	girl	describes	‘watching	herself	from	the	outside’.	Two	factors,	
however,	make	this	case	different:	the	first	is	the	girl’s	very	young	age;	the	second	is	that	being	
abused	by	her	father	was	not	a	one‐off	trauma	but	a	regular	part	of	her	life.	Where	a	traumatic	
experience	 followed	by	dissociation	 is	repeated	frequently	and	deeply,	especially	 in	childhood,	
the	brain’s	state	of	dissociation	can	become	a	trait	(Perry	et	al.	1995),	a	characteristic	of	the	way	
the	brain	responds	to	any	distress	signal:	in	short,	a	dissociative	disorder.		
	
In	all	DDs	the	extent	of	the	‘disowned’	or	dissociated	material	is	not	limited	to	a	single	traumatic	
event,	but	extends	into	most	areas	of	the	person’s	life	and	affects	the	ways	he	or	she	remembers	
or	 processes	 events	 or	 responds	 to	 new	 stressors.	 In	 DID,	 not	 only	 the	 traumatic	 events	 are	
dissociated,	 but	 also	 the	 very	 identity	 of	 the	 person	 (hence	 the	 name	 Dissociative	 Identity	
Disorder).		
	
In	the	person	with	DID,	different	events,	experiences,	feelings,	skills	and	stages	of	one’s	life	are	
‘owned’	by	distinct,	separate	parts	of	the	personality.	These	are	often	referred	to	as	self‐states,	
ego‐states,	personalities,	parts	or	alters.	We	may	say	 they	are	 like	people	who	 live	 in	separate	
apartments	within	 the	 same	building	 (the	 ‘building’	being	 the	person’s	body),	with	only	a	 few	
interconnecting	doors	between	 them.	The	person	 thus	does	not	 function	 ‘as	a	whole’,	as	he	or	
she	does	not	have	access	to	their	full	identity,	memories	and	abilities.		
	
To	illustrate	this,	consider	a	non‐dissociative	person,	who	may	describe	herself	as	follows:	‘I	am	
50	years	old,	I	have	two	children,	I’m	a	computer	engineer	and	I	play	the	piano	in	my	spare	time’.	
These	same	facts,	related	to	a	person	with	DID,	may	be	presented	quite	differently:	a	part	of	the	
person	has	the	identity	of	a	50‐year‐old	engineer.	She	always	works.	Another	part	is	the	mother	
of	 two	 children,	 and	 only	manifests	 in	 their	 presence.	 She	 is	 thus	 not	 aware	 of	 ever	 going	 to	
work,	 and	has	never	 learned	 to	play	 the	piano.	Another	part	 is	 that	woman	when	 she	was	an	
abused	child:	this	part	 feels	and	talks	 like	a	 frightened	five‐year‐old,	and	knows	nothing	about	
having	had	 children	 or	 a	 professional	 life.	 And	 another	 part	 loves	music.	 She	plays	 the	piano,	
always.	Each	of	these	alternate	parts	(or	alters)	has	a	different	life	story,	age	and	name.	We	can	
see	it	clearly	in	the	following	clinical	example:	
	
Lily,	aged	13,	was	adamant	that	‘nothing	bad	had	ever	happened	to	her’.	Her	many	
episodes	of	being	abused	did	not	happened	to	‘her’,	but	to	‘Rob’,	a	little	boy	that	was	
created	in	her	dissociative	mind.	Lily	didn’t	know	that	Rob	existed,	nor	did	he	know	
that	she	did.	From	her	perspective,	which	did	not	include	Rob’s	perspective,	she	was	
perfectly	truthful	and	correct	in	her	assertion	about	her	unharmed	life.	By	contrast,	
Rob’s	life	contained	nothing	but	abuse.	
	
The	confusing	presentation	and	contradictory	accounts	provided	by	people	with	DID	has	given	
rise	to	considerable	suspicion	regarding	their	truthfulness,	in	forensic	as	well	as	in	psychological	
and	 psychiatric	 settings.	 People	 with	 DID	 have	 often	 been	 –	 and	 still	 often	 are	 –	 deemed	
malingering,	psychotically	hallucinating	or	 ‘attention	 seekers’.	 Indeed,	my	 assertion	 that	 these	
disorders	are	 trauma‐related	has	only	 recently	become	more	widely	accepted,	 following	some	
30	years	of	fierce	debate.	Notably,	the	third	and	fourth	editions	of	the	Diagnostic	and	Statistical	
Manual	of	Psychiatric	Disorders	(APA	1980,	2000)	placed	DDs	next	to	the	 ‘fictitious	disorders’	
category.	Only	in	the	current,	fifth	edition	of	the	DSM	(APA	2013),	are	DDs	explicitly	placed	next	
to	 ‘Trauma	 and	 stressor‐related	 disorders’,	 this	 placement	 ‘reflecting	 the	 close	 relationship	
between	the	two’	(APA	2013:	291).		
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The	origins	of	DID	
Evidence	is	accumulating	(Dorahy	et	al.	2014)	to	show	that	Other	Specified	Dissociative	Disorder	
(OSDD)	 and	DID	 are	 linked	 to	 severe	 childhood	 trauma	 and	 abuse.	 Almost	 invariably,	 people	
with	 these	 disorders	 (DID	 and	 OSDD)	 report	 years	 of	 continuous,	 most	 extreme	 trauma.	
Although	their	accounts	are	not	always	proven	or	provable,	the	sheer	numbers	of	such	accounts,	
the	similarity	of	their	details	and	the	lack	of	any	conceivable	benefit	to	the	person	make	the	idea	
of	 malingering	 unlikely	 in	 most	 cases.	 In	 an	 interview,	 Chris	 Healey	 (2008),	 retired	 head	 of	
Portsmouth	CID,	describes	several	police	 investigations	based	on	accounts	of	people	with	DID,	
most	 of	whom	he	 considered	 to	 be	 sound	witnesses.	 Indeed,	 in	many	 cases,	 people	with	DID	
report	to	the	police	information	about	their	own	past	criminal	activities.	
	
In	 therapy,	 people	with	 DID	 (or	 their	 alters)	 describe	 growing	 up	 in	 the	 shadow	 of	 on‐going	
sadistic	 sexual,	 psychological	 and	physical	 abuse,	usually	by	multiple	perpetrators	 (Chu	2011;	
Kluft	 1999;	 Mollon	 1996;	 Sachs	 2008;	 Stain	 2007).	 Most	 of	 them	 explain	 that	 abuse	 is	
inseparable	 from	 their	 everyday	 life,	 and	 is	 practiced	 and	 suffered	 by	 every	member	 of	 their	
family,	 for	 generations	 (Middleton	 2013b;	Miller	 2012;	 Sachs	 2011).	 Others	 report	 organised	
sexual	abuse,	human	trafficking	and	group	ritual	abuse	(Healey	2008;	Miller	2012;	Salter	2013;	
Sinason	2011),	years	of	incestual	abuse	(Middleton	2013a,	2013b)	and	organised	torture	(Ross	
2000).	Many	confess	to	abusing	others	(including	 family	members)	or	 to	committing	murders,	
and	 hold	 these	 recollections	 of	 perpetration	 as	 the	most	 traumatic	 of	 all	 of	 their	 experiences	
(Sachs	2013a).	Indeed,	as	recollections	of	inflicting	abuse	are	so	traumatic,	they	tend	to	be	some	
of	the	most	heavily	dissociated,	and	require	much	therapeutic	help	before	they	can	emerge.		
	
It	is	important	to	bear	in	mind	that	the	abuse	described	above	occurs	within	a	setting	to	which	
one	 belongs	 (willingly	 or	 otherwise).	 Freyd	 (1996)	 talks	 about	 the	 devastating	 impact	 of	
betrayal	on	the	incestually	abused	child,	and	how	amnesia	to	(that	is,	dissociation	of)	the	incest	
serves	as	protection.	For	the	person	with	DID,	 this	usually	means	that	some	of	 their	alters	are	
aware	 of	 the	 abuse	 and	 want	 to	 avoid	 it,	 while	 other	 alters	 are	 only	 aware	 of	 the	 ‘sense	 of	
belonging’	 or	 even	 love.	 The	 latter	 alters	 have	 nothing	 to	 prevent	 them	 from	 continued	
involvement	with	the	abusers	(Sachs	2011;	Sinason	2011).		Moreover,	some	alters	are	identified	
with	 the	 abusers	 and	 admire	 their	 strength,	 cruelty	 or	 high	 standing	 within	 the	 group	 (for	
example,	 boy	 soldiers	 admire	 their	 commanders)	 or	 family.	 Such	 alters	may	 feel	 nothing	 but	
loathing	and	contempt	for	the	suffering	of	the	abused	whether	the	abused	is	an	external	person	
or	one	of	their	own	alters.	They,	too,	have	no	reason	to	change	or	stop	a	relationship	in	which	
abuse	never	stops.		
	
Growing	up	with	such	level	of	continuous	trauma	is	so	devastating	that	the	mind	cannot	contain	
it	without	 extraordinary	measures.	DID	 is	 just	 such	 an	 extraordinary	measure.	 It	 protects	 the	
person	from	experiencing	the	trauma,	as	well	as	from	any	knowledge	about	it.	This	protection,	
however,	comes	at	a	cost.	As	well	as	the	chaos	of	a	life	run	by	a	group	of	un‐coordinated	parts,	
such	a	person	is	also	unable	to	learn	from	his	or	her	life	experience.	For	most	people,	memories	
of	 trauma,	 devastating	 as	 they	 are,	 also	 serve	 as	 warnings	 against	 dangerous	 situations	 or	
people.	 In	 their	 absence,	however,	 the	dissociative	person	 is	 exposed	 to	 the	 risk	of	 innocently	
walking	into	danger,	over	and	over	again.		
	
The	 following	 clinical	 example	 demonstrates	 several	 of	 these	 features	 of	 DID:	 the	 vast	
differences	between	the	experiences,	views	and	accounts	of	different	alters	regarding	traumatic	
events;	 the	subsequent	uncertainty	 that	professionals	 feel	 regarding	 the	reliability	of	accounts	
given	by	these	patients;	the	on‐going	risk	to	their	safety;	and	the	question	of	how	much	choice	
they	have	regarding	some	of	their	actions.	
	
	
	
Adah	Sachs:	Who	Done	It,	Actually:	Dissociative	Identity	Disorder	for	the	Criminologist	
	
IJCJ&SD								69	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com																																																																				©	2015	4(2)	
Clinical	example:	Paula3	
	
Kim	distracted	everyone’s	attention	by	starting	a	family	row.	While	a	dozen	people	
were	 shouting	 at	 each	 other,	 she	 sneaked	 out	 of	 the	 house,	 taking	 her	 younger	
sister,	Polly,	with	her.	Once	on	 the	 train,	 she	 rang	 John:	 ‘I’m	on	 the	 train,	 John!	 I	
can’t	wait	 to	 see	 you	and	 the	baby’.	Polly,	now	 realising	 that	 they	were	going	 to	
meet	 John,	was	horrified.	She	 tried	 to	object:	 John	was	a	very	dangerous	man,	he	
had	hurt	them	badly	in	the	past.	Kim	told	her	to	shut	up	and	mind	her	own	business.			
	
Kim	and	John,	her	cousin,	were	married	as	children.	It	was	like	a	Romeo	and	Juliet	
story,	Kim	 told	me:	 they	 loved	each	other,	and	had	a	baby	when	 she	was	12.	But	
then	 there	was	 some	 serious	 feud	between	 their	 families,	and	 she	and	 John	were	
torn	apart.	John’s	parents,	her	aunt	and	uncle,	ended	up	raising	the	baby.	Kim	was	
now	39.	Her	baby,	 that	she	was	about	 to	meet	 for	 the	 first	 time	since	he	was	 two	
years	old,	was	27.		
	
Two	hours	later,	with	Polly	still	frantically	begging	Kim	to	turn	back,	they	stepped	
out	of	the	station.	A	blue	van	waited	for	them	right	in	front	of	the	exit,	and	a	man’s	
voice	that	Kim	recognised	shouted	 ‘get	 in,	quick,	he	 is	waiting	 for	you’.	Three	men	
helped	 them	 in,	 shut	 the	 doors	 and	 drove	 off.	 The	 small	 space	 reeked	 of	 garlic,	
alcohol	and	sweat.	Kim	looked	around.	No	John.	No	baby.		She	went	numb	after	that.	
Next	to	her,	Polly	was	being	brutally	raped	by	the	three	men.				
	
They	were	let	out	of	the	van	in	an	unfamiliar	street.	Lea,	beside	herself	with	worry	
when	she	realised	they	were	gone,	had	found	them	there:	Polly	dishevelled,	shaking	
and	crying,	Kim	silent	and	pale.	Lea	phoned	me	in	panic,	and	we	spent	the	next	two	
hours	on	 the	phone,	while	 I	directed	her	 through	bus	 lines	and	 trains	on	her	way	
home.	As	well	as	being	upset,	Lea	was	worried	about	how	 to	 tell	 the	 story	 to	 the	
family:	 ‘they	 can	 be	 very	 funny	 about	 things,	 you	 know,	 with	 beatings	 and	
punishments;	I	don’t	want	no	one	hurt’.	We	agreed	that	she	should	settle	the	girls	
first,	help	them	change	and	put	all	their	clothes	into	a	plastic	bag	to	take	it	to	the	
police,	before	talking	to	the	rest	of	the	family.	
	
When	they	arrived	home,	they	received	a	very	mixed	reaction	from	the	family:	some	
were	furious	with	Kim	for	taking	such	a	risk.	Some	never	noticed	that	the	girls	were	
gone,	and	didn’t	believe	any	of	it.	Some	didn’t	want	to	hear	Lea’s	story.	Some	were	
deeply	 upset,	 one	 felt	 suicidal	 because	 it	 reminded	 her	 of	 her	 own	 history.	 Kim	
herself,	 sniggering,	went	 to	have	a	bath.	 She	 couldn’t	 stand	all	 this	 fuss	over	her	
private	 affairs.	 Someone	 else	 ‐	 I	 don’t	 know	who	 ‐	 took	 the	 plastic	 bag	with	 the	
clothes	and	washed	everything.	Polly	was	too	distraught	to	talk	to	anyone.	She	had	
a	bleach	bath,	because	 she	 felt	dirty.	The	next	morning,	at	Lea’s	 insistence,	Polly	
went	 to	 see	 the	GP,	because	 she	was	 in	 so	much	pain.	The	GP	 said	 that	Polly	had	
grazes	and	bruises	around	her	genitals,	ribs,	ankles	and	wrists,	but	having	washed	
herself	with	bleach,	no	other	signs	of	rape	could	be	found.		
	
And	was	there	a	rape?		
	
Paula	 is	a	woman	with	DID.	She	has	over	90	alters,	 including	Kim,	Polly	and	Lea.	
They	all	share	one	body.	Kim	maintains	that	it	is	her	body,	and	that	she	was	never	
raped.	Polly	believes	that	the	body	is	hers,	and	that	she	was.	Lea	believes	Polly,	but	
she	wasn’t	 there	when	 it	happened	 so	 she	 can’t	 testify.	The	 ‘main	person’,	Paula,	
knew	nothing	of	the	whole	affair:	she	was	at	home,	ironing.	
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Discussion:	What	really	happened?		
Paula	was	not	 able	 to	 answer	 this	question.	The	memories	of	her	 childhood,	 as	well	 as	of	her	
recent	past,	have	been	divided	across	a	large	number	of	alters,	each	of	whom	holds	a	few	pieces	
of	the	puzzle.	By	the	re‐appearance	of	injuries	on	her	body	she	gathers	that	she	often	gets	hurt.	
She	 remembers	 having	 been	pregnant	 twice,	 but	 she	 can’t	 recall	 ever	 having	 intercourse.	 She	
doesn’t	know	if	she	has	ever	had	any	babies.	According	to	Paula,	John	was	a	distant	relative	who	
always	mocked	and	teased	her	as	a	child.	He	now	owned	a	building	firm,	and	she	saw	him	from	
time	to	time	in	the	neighbourhood,	driving	his	blue	work‐van.			
	
Several	of	her	alters	spoke	of	having	had	abortions	(which	suggests	that	Paula	may	have	been	
pregnant	more	 than	 twice).	The	 alter	Kim	has	had	one	baby,	 and	was	devastated	 at	 his	being	
taken	away	from	her.	Kim	is	frozen	in	time,	aged	15.	She	is	a	spunky	teenager	and	has	never	lost	
hope	to	get	her	baby	back.	She	and	John	continue	to	meet	secretly	and	have	sex.		
	
Polly	 is	a	child	alter,	aged	eight	years,	who	has	reported	being	raped	by	 John	many	times.	She	
has	never	been	pregnant.		
	
Lea,	an	alter	aged	35	years,	said	that	John	is	a	‘nasty	piece	of	work’,	and	that	his	son	was	as	bad	
as	 he	 was,	 though	 ‘looking	 every	 bit	 like	 his	 mother	 (Paula),	 who	 couldn’t	 hurt	 a	 fly’.	 She	
explained	to	me	that	Paula	didn’t	know	that	she	was	the	mother	of	John’s	son.	Rather	strikingly,	
Lea	never	seemed	to	realise	that,	as	she	and	Paula	shared	a	body,	John’s	son	was	also	her	own	
son;	nor	did	she	notice	how	similar	his	face	was	to	her	own	face.	
	
A	male	 alter	 of	 Paula,	 named	 John,	 is	 (the	 external)	 John’s	 best	mate.	 The	 two	 Johns	 often	 go	
together	for	a	beer,	and,	as	the	alter	John	tells	me,	they	‘always	have	a	laugh’.	
	
As	we	can	readily	see,	each	one	of	these	accounts	or	perspectives	is	truthful;	but	none	of	them	is	
the	truth.	Even	the	eye	of	an	external	witness	–	say,	a	neighbour	–	could	not	get	us	much	closer	
to	the	truth:	what	is	visible	is	the	pair	Paula	and	John,	who	had	a	baby	together	when	they	were	
teenagers;	the	baby	was	later	adopted	by	John’s	parents.	The	two	of	them	are	now	adults,	both	
single.	They	sometimes	go	to	the	pub	together,	sometimes	have	violent	sex,	and	sometimes	seem	
estranged	for	months.	Nothing	in	this	information	can	help	to	prove	or	disprove	a	possible	rape.	
	
In	 order	 to	 understand,	 and	 help	 Paula	 understand,	 the	 events	 of	 the	 day	 in	 which	 she	 was	
ironing	at	home	(or	of	any	other	day	in	her	life),	we	need	an	internal	witness:	one	who	is	able	to	
hear	the	communication	of	each	of	 the	alters,	understand	the	significance	of	certain	events	for	
each	of	them,	and	help	them	to	create	a	picture	which	will	reflect	their	joint	perspectives.	This,	in	
my	view,	is	the	most	important	and	challenging	task	of	psychotherapy	with	DID	patients,	and	it	
is	equally	challenging	for	the	criminologist	who	attempts	to	interview	them.		
	
Risk,	choice,	capacity	and	human	rights		
It	is	clear	that	Paula	is	at	a	high	risk	of	being	raped	or	otherwise	hurt	by	John,	as	well	as	by	other	
people.	However,	the	attacks	which	she	suffers	are	always	supported	and	aided	by	some	of	her	
own	alters.	Can	we	say	that	being	attacked	is	thus	her	choice?	Should	a	person	with	DID	be	seen	
as	 having	 capacity,	 if	 they	 make	 such	 choices?	 Can	 such	 person	 be	 deemed	 a	 ‘competent,	
practical	reasoner’	(Schopp	2001)?4	
	
Paula’s	 full	history	 is	divided	between	many	alters	and	 thus	not	accessible	 to	her.	This	means	
that,	 for	example,	the	part	of	her	which	is	still	 in	love	with	John	of	her	teenage	years	(the	alter	
Kim,	aged	15	years)	has	no	knowledge	of	any	danger,	and	is	always	eager	to	meet	him	and	her	
baby.	 She	 is	 not	 alarmed	by	 invitations	 to	 get	 into	dark	 vans	with	unfamiliar	men,	 as	 she	has	
never	been	hurt	in	such	circumstance:	before	any	hurt	begins,	she	‘switches’	into	the	child‐alter	
Polly.	 Polly,	 who	 is	 scared	 of	 John	 and	 wants	 to	 escape	 him,	 has	 no	 power	 to	 prevent	 the	
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meetings.	The	alter	Lea	seems	wise	and	able,	but	her	role	in	the	system	is	to	‘pick	up	the	pieces’,	
so	she	never	appears	early	enough	to	change	the	outcome.	And	Paula,	dissociative	to	all	of	this,	
knows	nothing	before	or	after	these	episodes.	In	fact,	she	finds	any	remotely	sexual	situation	so	
distressing	that	another	alter	instantly	takes	over,	thus	leaving	her	(that	is,	the	Self	that	she	is	as	
Paula)	no	choice	over	what	will	happen	next.		
	
One	may	 argue	 that	 Paula,	 as	 the	 victim,	 should	 be	 protected	 by	 the	 police.	 But	 she	 has	 not	
requested	 such	 protection,	 and	 not	 being	 aware	 of	 being	 attacked,	 does	 not	 deem	 herself	 a	
victim.	Polly	and	Lea	would	welcome	help	and	protection,	but	the	alter	Kim	would	be	very	upset	
if	her	beloved	man	was	arrested.	Police	intervention	would	thus	be	against	her	will,	rather	than	
offer	her	protection.	The	alter	John,	similarly,	would	argue	that	his	mate	 is	 innocent,	as	he	has	
never	witnessed	him	doing	any	wrong.	 	Any	action	by	an	external	agent	(for	example,	a	social	
worker,	 a	police	officer	 or	 a	 therapist)	would	 inevitably	 violate	 some	human	 rights,	 by	 taking	
choice	 away	 from	 some	 alters	 and	 acting	 on	 behalf	 of	 others;	 and	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 justify	 such	
violation	 when	 one	 cannot	 be	 certain	 who	 (if	 any)	 of	 the	 alters	 provides	 the	 most	 accurate	
account	of	the	events.		
	
Questioning	one’s	capacity	and	agency	must	be	considered	extremely	carefully,	as	 it	 inevitably	
presents	a	degree	of	threat	to	one’s	human	rights	under	the	Human	Rights	Act	(1998):	notably,	
the	right	to	liberty	and	security	(article	5);	the	right	to	respect	for	privacy	and	family	life	(article	
8);	and	the	right	to	marry	(article	12).	This	question	becomes	far	more	complex	when	we	meet	a	
number	of	alters,	each	of	whom	claims	to	be	‘the	person’	and	where	each	demands	the	right	to	
make	her/his	own	choices.	
	
The	parts	and	the	whole	
Looking	 at	 the	 individual	 alters	 while	 keeping	 in	 mind	 their	 perspectives	 and	 interests,	 we	
would	 usually	 be	 impressed	 with	 the	 fact	 that	 their	 choices	 reflect	 coherent	 and	 reasonable	
thinking.	They	are	certainly	not	confused,	erratic	or	‘mad’;	and	it	is	relatively	easy	to	agree	that	
each	one	has	capacity.		
	
The	difficulties	arise	in	the	communication	–	or	lack	of	it	–	between	the	alters,	which	may	mean	
that	 disparities	 between	 their	 respective	wishes	 could	 result	 in	 violent	 conflict	 between	 their	
subsequent	actions.	Indeed,	this	is	a	key	characteristic	of	DID:	while	the	non‐dissociative	person,	
perhaps	through	great	 internal	conflicts,	eventually	reaches	a	decision	which	shapes	his	or	her	
actions,	the	person	with	DID	experiences	an	external	conflict	between	warring	alters,	who	would	
each	gladly	 ‘hijack’	 the	action	 if	 they	could.	Furthermore,	 this	external	struggle	 is	often	 fought	
with	blindfolds	on,	so	to	speak,	as	alters	may	not	even	know	who	opposes	their	actions,	when	
they	have	no	knowledge	about	the	alters	who	do	so.	
	
Are	we	then	to	assume	that	the	actions	of	a	person	with	DID	are	quite	random,	and	express	the	
wishes	of	whoever	happens	to	be	the	‘up’	alter	at	a	given	moment?	This	is	a	critical	question.	A	
positive	 answer	 to	 it	 will	 lead	 us	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	 person	 with	 DID	 has	 no	 overall	
identity,	 and	 thus	no	 agency	or	 capacity	beyond	 the	 individual	 alters.	 	A	negative	 answer	will	
ignore	 and	deny	 the	 reality	 of	DID	 and	 the	 incredible	 everyday	difficulties	 of	 the	person	with	
DID.			
	
I	believe	 that	part	of	 the	answer	can	be	 found	 in	 close	examination	of	 the	 ‘switching’	process.		
Who	–	or	what	–	determines	which	alter	will	replace	the	alter	currently	in	control,	and	at	what	
exact	moment?	Is	the	switching	random,	or	is	it	governed	by	some	‘internal	logic’	of	the	system	
as	a	whole,	which	can	be	seen	as	the	pre‐cursor	of	the	capacity	to	make	choices?	
	
People’s	 choices,	 even	 when	 appearing	 to	 be	 ‘bad	 choices’,	 always	 reflect	 their	 own	 deepest	
sense	of	what	 is	 ‘good	for	 them’.	A	person	may	work	cripplingly	hard	 for	a	cause	which	 is	 felt	
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worthy;	betray	a	friend	to	satisfy	a	personal	wish;	deny	one’s	own	needs	for	the	sake	of	a	loved	
one;	punish	oneself	 to	 relieve	guilt	 or	 to	please	God.	One	may	murder	out	of	greed,	hatred	or	
fear,	or	 commit	 suicide	when	 the	alternative	 seems	worse.	 Such	actions,	 controversial	 as	 they	
may	be,	reflect	the	deepest	and	most	personal	choices	that	one	can	make.		
	
I	 suggest	 that	 the	 person	with	DID	does	 the	 same.	 It	 is	 not	 only	 the	 alters	who	make	 choices	
(according	to	their	own	wishes,	 fears	or	desires).	The	whole	system,	or	the	person	as	a	whole,	
also	makes	choices	about	which	alter	 is	 felt	 to	be	the	most	suitable	alter	 for	 the	situation;	and	
these	choices	are	surprisingly	sensible	and	not	in	the	least	random.	For	example,	an	alter	called	
‘the	professional’	 is	always	 ‘up’	when	 the	person	 is	 in	 their	work	environment.	An	alter	called	
‘the	mother’	is	present	most	of	the	time	when	the	person’s	children	are	present,	especially	if	they	
are	 young.	 A	 compliant,	 young	 and	 powerless	 alter	 is	 in	 position	 when	 (like	 in	 the	 person’s	
childhood)	 it	 is	not	possible	 to	resist	 the	abuser,	and	the	best	chance	 for	survival	 is	 to	 ‘freeze’	
and	give	in.	Similarly,	a	promiscuous	alter	called	‘red	dress’	gets	triggered	by	a	man	who	makes	a	
pass	at	her	on	the	train.	Mute,	very	young	or	learning	disabled	alters	appear	when	questioned	by	
the	 police,	 thereby	 keeping	 safe	 the	 family	 secrets;	 and	 an	 alter	 called	 ‘the	 avenger’	 may	 be	
willing	to	speak	to	a	seasoned	therapist	and	explain	that	the	mute	child	was	going	to	be	killed	if	
the	child	spoke.	An	alter	called	 ‘fish’	appears	when	 recalling	a	maternal	attempt	 to	drown	 the	
child	(being	a	 fish	relieves	the	terror	of	drowning);	and	an	alter	called	 ‘robot’	may	report,	 in	a	
mechanical	 voice,	 having	 attempted	 to	 drown	 a	 child	 who	 told	 secrets.	 Each	 of	 these	 alters	
appears,	on	 cue,	when	 the	external	 situation	 requires	 their	particular	 skills.	And	 the	ability	 to	
bring	to	the	fore	the	right	alter	at	the	right	time	could	only	be	understood	as	some	centralised	
functioning,	overall	identity	or	a	rudimentary	Self.		
	
For	 the	 psychotherapist,	 this	 recognition	 points	 towards	 focusing	 much	 of	 the	 therapeutic	
efforts	on	helping	that	rudimentary	Self	to	develop	and	grow	(Sachs	2014).		
	
Paula:	So	what	really	happened?	
After	 years	 of	 therapy,	 this	 is	 how	Paula	 explained	what	 had	 happened	 to	 her	while	 she	was	
ironing.	
	
Her	need	to	see	her	baby	and	the	boy	she	loved	(as	expressed	by	her	Kim	alter)	were	sometimes	
stronger	 than	her	own	(Paula)	aversion	to	sex,	and	broke	 through	her	amnesia	of	ever	having	
had	 a	 baby.	 The	 longing	 for	 the	 baby	 also	 prevailed	 over	 her	 fear	 of	 John’s	 brutality	 and	 her	
previous	 experiences	 of	 meeting	 with	 him	 (as	 expressed	 by	 the	 alter	 Polly).	 She	 was	 indeed	
raped	 (as	 Polly)	 by	 John,	 his	 brother,	 and	 by	 her	 27‐year	 old	 son:	 even	 Kim,	 who	may	 have	
wanted	to	have	sex	with	John,	was	not	consenting	to	the	other	two	men.	After	it	was	all	over,	she	
(as	 the	 alter	 Lea)	 did	 all	 the	 sensible	 things:	 called	 for	 help,	 prepared	 for	 going	 to	 the	police,	
went	to	see	the	GP.	But	Kim’s	longing	to	see	her	baby	was	so	strong	that	it	only	allowed	Lea	to	
appear	on	the	scene	at	the	end,	when	she	couldn’t	stop	the	meeting	from	happening.	
	
Most	interestingly,	Lea	also	tried	to	evoke	Paula’s	centralised	functioning,	by	‘telling	the	story	to	
the	whole	family’	(of	alters).	At	the	time	this	attempt	failed	because	the	other	alters	didn’t	listen	
or	didn’t	believe	the	story;	and	whoever	did	believe	it	took	the	action	of	destroying	the	evidence	
(washing	the	clothes,	bathing	in	bleach).	This,	in	part,	was	to	protect	John,	but	it	also	protected	
Paula	 from	 learning	 the	 truth.	 Paula’s	 ‘sensible	 life’	 was	 fully	 protected,	 while	 her	 body	
continued	to	get	hurt	over	and	over	again.		
	
When	Paula	recovered	her	centralised	functioning	to	the	point	of	being	able	to	hear	all	her	alters	
describe	what	had	happened	to	them	over	the	years,	her	condition	deteriorated	sharply.	Rage,	
fear,	guilt,	physical	pain	and	the	crushing	realisation	of	the	loss	of	her	baby	made	her	sink	into	
severe	depression,	and	self‐loathing	made	her	suicidal.	At	the	same	time,	her	self‐loathing	also	
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had	a	healing	–	and	even	thrilling	–	feel,	as	it	implied	an	actual	Self.	In	due	course,	the	loathing	
changed	into	compassion,	while	her	overall	Self	continued	to	develop	and	grow.		
	
Interviewing	a	person	with	DID	
For	 all	 the	 reasons	 discussed	 in	 this	 paper,	 people	 with	 DID	 are	 usually	 considered	 to	 be	
unreliable	 witnesses,	 difficult	 (or	 even	 impossible)	 to	 interview,	 and	 potentially	 at	 risk	 of	
deteriorating	through	the	process	of	an	interview.	As	a	result,	clinicians	and	criminologists	alike	
tend	 to	 avoid	 asking,	 listening	 to	 and	 relying	 on	 anything	 said	 by	 people	with	 DID,	 and	 their	
accounts,	which	 could	be	 critical	 for	understanding	 situations,	may	be	missing.	This	 omission,	
though	understandable,	compromises	our	ability	to	learn	the	truth	(‘the	interests	of	the	case’),	as	
well	as	the	interests	–	and	human	rights	–	of	the	person	with	DID.	I	suggest	that	interviewing	a	
person	with	DID	 regarding	 crimes	 that	 they	have	been	 involved	 in	 is	 necessary,	 possible,	 and	
often	quite	therapeutic.		
	
Perhaps	surprisingly,	given	the	severity	of	this	condition,	recovery	from	DID	is	often	successful	
(Brand,	 Loewenstein	 and	 Spiegel	 2014;	 Brand	 et	 al.	 2013;	 Dorahy	 et	 al.	 2014).	 However,	 the	
process	is	complex,	requires	specialised	psychotherapy,	and	is	lengthy:	five	years	and	upwards	
(International	Society	for	the	Study	of	Trauma	and	Dissociation	2011).	The	interviewer	of	a	DID	
patient	(in	court,	hospital,	victim	support	centre	or	prison)	needs	to	gain	insight	into	situations	
like	 Paula’s	 rape	 quickly,	 while	 not	 compromising	 the	 patient’s	 well‐being.	 In	 the	 following	
section	I	offer	some	guidelines	for	an	ethical	and	useful	interview	with	a	person	with	DID.		
	
 The	environment	must	be	 (and	 feel)	 as	 safe	 as	possible.	Owing	 to	 their	 severe	 trauma	
history,	 DID	 patients	 are	 highly	 sensitive	 to	 any	 perceived	 threat	 or	 manipulation.	
Importantly,	the	interviewer	has	to	be	open	and	respectful,	and	acknowledge	their	own	
limitations	truthfully	(‘I	don’t	know	all	that	much	about	alters;	perhaps	you	could	correct	
me	where	I	make	a	mistake	or	say	the	wrong	thing’).	
 Even	 though	 you	 only	 see	 one	 person	 sitting	 opposite	 you,	 remember	 that	 you	 are	
always	 talking	 to	a	group.	 The	 relationships	between	 the	members	of	 the	group	 range	
from	friendliness	to	war.	Some	of	those	present	are	young	children	and	some	are	older	
than	the	main	person	(and	perhaps	older	than	you).	Many	of	the	members	are	wearing	
blindfolds	and	are	not	aware	of	other	alters.	Your	questions	or	comments	thus	must	be	
very	carefully	worded,	so	as	to	respect	the	feelings	and	the	safety	of	everyone	present.	
 There	 are	 many	 accounts	 of	 the	 same	 event.	 For	 each	 alter	 who	 participated	 in	 or	
witnessed	it,	the	event	had	a	different	meaning;	and	many	alters	were	not	there	and	will	
state	that	 it	did	not	happen	at	all.	Each	of	 them	tells	the	truth	(as	they	know	it).	Alters	
very	rarely	lie,	as	they	rarely	possess	the	complexity	required	to	do	so.		
 The	more	accounts	you	hear,	the	closer	you	get	to	a	true	representation	of	the	events.	It	
is	thus	important	to	listen	to	all	communication,	rather	than	to	let	only	the	‘main	person’	
speak.	 As	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Paula,	 the	 main	 person	 or	 the	 ANP	 (the	 Apparently	 Normal	
Personality)	may	know	the	 least	about	what	happened	or	about	the	risks	that	 they	are	
facing.		
 Some	 of	 the	more	 confusing	 presentations	 (for	 example,	 a	 very	 young	 child,	 a	 dog,	 an	
alter	who	is	237	years	old	or	a	monster)	may	be	able	to	tell	more	than	the	ANP.	Be	polite	
and	respectful,	thank	them	for	their	willingness	to	talk	to	you,	and	pay	attention	to	how	
they	 communicate.	 If	 they	 can’t	 talk	 (because	 they	 are	 a	 dog	 or	 because	 they	 are	 not	
allowed	to	speak),	they	may	be	able	to	write,	draw,	point	or	nod.	
 Some	 alters	 are	 there	 in	 order	 to	 obscure	 the	 picture	 that	 you	 are	 trying	 to	 discover.	
They	do	that	because	they	have	no	reason	to	trust	you,	and	they	have	always	managed	
life	by	 creating	 smoke‐screens.	This	has	 to	be	 respected	 as	 the	 limit	which	 the	person	
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sets.	 If	 you	 have	 more	 than	 one	 interview,	 and	 if	 you	 have	 been	 respectful	 and	
thoughtful,	this	limit	may	gradually	shift.		
 The	 striving	 for	 survival	 unites	 all	 the	 alters,	 even	 the	 suicidal	 ones.	 This	 is	 often	
expressed	by	striving	for	closeness	with	the	attachment	figure	(Bowlby	1958,	1988)	even	
when	 that	 attachment	 figure	 is	 dysfunctional	 or	 plain	 dangerous.	 This	 seemingly	
paradoxical	 reach	 towards	 a	 dangerous	 person	 occurs	 in	 all	 cases	 of	 disorganised	
attachment	(Bentovim	1995;	Liotti	1999;	Main	1995;	Sachs	2008,	2011,	2013a,	2013b).	
As	the	striving	for	survival	is	so	highly	valued	by	all	the	alters,	you	will	always	be	correct	
in	praising	each	alter	for	doing	all	that	was	in	their	power	for	being	safe.	It	enhances	the	
self	 esteem	 of	 all	 the	 alters,	 and	 promotes	 a	 sense	 of	 a	 shared	 achievement	 and	 their	
overall	identity.		
 The	 relief	 of	 being	 heard,	 understood	 and	 believed	 is	 quite	 rare	 in	 the	 lives	 of	 people	
with	 DID.	 Having	 such	 an	 experience	 has	 the	 power	 to	 break	 through	 the	 isolation	 in	
which	they	live,	and	create	a	sense	of	connection	between	the	dissociative	person	and	all	
those	who	have	not	been	abused.		
	
Conclusions	
This	paper	attempted	to	address	questions	which	are	very	difficult	to	answer	regarding	people	
with	DID.	 Is	 it	possible	 to	determine	what	exactly	happened	 in	 the	 traumatic	past	of	a	person	
who	does	not	have	full	access	to	his	or	her	memories?	Is	a	person	who	is	barred	from	knowing	
about	risks	 to	 their	safety	(as	 this	knowledge	 is	held	by	separate	alters)	capable	of	making	an	
informed	decision,	and	does	he	or	she	have	a	real	choice?	Do	we	have	the	right	‐	or	the	duty	‐	to	
protect	the	person’s	safety,	if	by	doing	so	we	transgress	some	of	their	human	rights?	And,	most	
fundamentally,	does	a	person	with	DID	have	an	overall	identity	or	Self?	
	
My	 view	 is	 that	 the	 sequence	 of	 the	 ‘switching’	 of	 alters	 in	 a	 person	with	DID	 reveals	 a	 non‐
random	pattern:	the	alters	who	 ‘appear’	and	take	over	the	person’s	 functioning	are	always	the	
ones	who	can	best	handle	the	challenges	of	the	moment	(even	if	their	choices	may	not	be	to	our	
liking).	 I	 therefore	 conclude	 that	 the	 person	 with	 DID	 does	 have	 a	 mode	 of	 centralised	
functioning,	overall	identity	or	Self,	with	the	capacity	to	make	choices	for	the	whole	person	(at	
the	very	least,	regarding	which	alter	should	come	up).	I	further	conclude	that	therapeutic	efforts	
(as	well	as	 interviewing	 techniques)	must	 focus	on	acknowledging	 that	Self,	 rudimentary	as	 it	
may	 be,	 and	help	 it	 to	 grow	 and	develop.	Ultimately,	 that	will	 increase	 the	 person’s	 ability	 to	
access	their	past,	make	progressively	more	informed	decisions	and	be	safer.	
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1	Dr	Sachs	is	an	attachment‐based	psychoanalytic	psychotherapist.		
2	The	early	traumatic	origin	of	depersonalisation	and	derealisation	dissociative	disorders	is	not	proven	at	this	stage.	
3	This	case	is	presented	with	only	minimal	changes,	at	the	request	of	Paula.	
4	 The	 question	whether	 persons	with	 DID	 have	 agency	 and	 capacity	 has	 been	much	 debated	with	 regard	 to	 their	
liability	to	bearing	criminal	responsibility.	For	an	excellent	summary	of	relevant	court	cases,	see	Farmer,	Middleton	
and	Devereux	(2008).	
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